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THE BIOLOGICAL PASSPORT: CLOSING 
THE NET ON DOPING 
PETER CHARLISH∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The use and, indeed, the dangers of performance-enhancing drugs in 
sports have a long history.  For example, the first recorded death linked to 
such substances during athletic competition took place in 1886 when a cyclist, 
Arthur Linton, overdosed on trimethyl.1  The first known use of performance-
enhancing drugs at the Olympic Games occurred in 1904 when Thomas Hicks 
of the United States won the Olympic marathon despite taking a concoction 
that included Strychnine and alcohol.2  In 1960, the first recorded death linked 
to drugs at the Olympic Games occurred when Danish cyclist Knud Jensen 
crashed and died; his autopsy revealed traces of amphetamines in his system.3   
It was at this time that pressure began to mount on the sporting authorities 
to combat the abuse of performance-enhancing substances.4  In 1966, the first 
drug tests were introduced by the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) and the 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) at their respective 
World Championships.5  The following year, the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) produced its first prohibited list of performance-enhancing 
substances (anabolic steroids were not added to that list until 1976), and its 
first official drug tests took place at the 1968 Winter and Summer Olympic 
Games.6  Still, the 1970s and 1980s saw the enactment of State Plan 14-25 in 
East Germany, which was a government plan⎯a very successful one⎯used 
for widespread systematic doping on promising young athletes to achieve 
      ∗ Peter Charlish is a Principal Lecturer in the Department of Law, Criminology & Community 
Justice at Sheffield Hallam University.  
1. Drugs in Sport: A Brief History, OBSERVER SPORT MONTHLY (Feb. 8, 2004) http://observer. 
guardian .co.uk/ osm/story/0,,1140775,00.html.  
2. Andy Bull, Cheats Sometimes Prosper, THE GUARDIAN (London) (May 30, 2008) http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/ sport/2008/may/30/drugsinsport.olympicgames.  
3. A Brief History of Anti-Doping, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/ 
en/About-WADA/History/A-Brief-History-of-Anti-Doping (last updated June 2010).  
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
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Olympic glory.  In 1998, the Festina7 scandal in the Tour de France occurred, 
in which the police discovered large quantities of drugs in the Festina team car 
and also at the Festina team headquarters in Lyon, France.8  It was this 
incident that eventually led to the formation of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA) in 1999 and the creation of the WADA Code (the Code), which 
came into effect January 1, 2004.9  The Code was the first attempt to provide a 
worldwide framework for the regulation of drugs in sports.  
The backbone and primary pillar of the Code was, and still is, the principle 
of strict liability.  The Code explains the principle: “it is not necessary that 
intent, fault, negligence[,] or knowing [u]se on the [a]thlete’s part be 
demonstrated in order to establish an anti-doping violation.”10  The comments 
to the Code go on to state that: 
The strict liability rule . . . provides a reasonable balance 
between effective anti-doping enforcement for the benefit of 
all “clean” Athletes and fairness in the exceptional 
circumstance where a Prohibited Substance entered an 
Athlete’s system through No Fault or Negligence or No 
Significant Fault or Negligence on the Athlete’s part . . . . The 
strict liability principle set forth in the Code has been 
consistently upheld in the decisions of [the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport].11 
The strict liability principle is viewed as fundamental to the fight against 
doping in sports.  Lord Sebastian Coe12 expressed this view in 2004, stating 
that “we cannot, without blinding reason and cause, move one millimeter from 
strict liability [⎯] if we do, the battle to save sport is lost.”13  Because the 
strict liability rule has been the basis of anti-doping rules in sports for many 
years, it was no surprise that the legality of the principle, in conjunction with 
the provision of a two-year ban for a doping violation, was challenged over 
twenty years ago in Gasser v. Stinson.14  In this case, Swiss middle-distance 
7. Festina was the number one team in the Tour de France at the time. 
8. A Brief History of Anti-Doping, supra note 3. 
9. WADA History, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/About-WADA/ 
History/ WADA-History/ (last updated Nov. 2009).  
10. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 2.1.1 (2011) [hereinafter WADA CODE]. 
11. See id at art. 2.1.1 cmt.  
12. Former double Olympic Gold Medalist at the 1500m. 
13. Sebastian Coe, We Cannot Move From Strict Liability Rule, DAILY TEL. (London) (Feb. 25, 
2004) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/main.jhtml?xml=/sport/2004/02/25/socoe25.xml. 
14. See generally Gasser v. Stinson, [1988] EWHC (Q.B.) 1 (Eng.). 
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runner Sandra Gasser challenged the two-year ban imposed upon her for 
testing positive for an illegal substance.15  She suggested that Rule 144 of the 
International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF), which provided strict 
liability, did not allow her to prove her innocence, and coupled with the 
subsequent two-year ban imposed on her for the commission of the doping 
violation, amounted to an unlawful restraint of trade.16  The Court of Queen’s 
Bench examined the strict liability rule and stated the following: 
The disqualification it imposes is automatic.  The 
disqualification does not depend upon any guilty intent on the 
part of the athlete.  He or she may not have known that the 
substance was being ingested.  The disqualification depends 
on no more than the finding of the prohibited substance in the 
athlete’s urine.17 
The Court of Queen’s Bench went on to support the IAAF’s position that 
doping posed a very serious threat to the integrity and future of sports, 
specifically by endorsing the view of the then-IAAF General Secretary, who 
stated, 
The use of drugs is widely regarded as a disease in sport.  
Competitors who use drugs to enhance their performance are 
simply cheating.  Any sport [that] is infiltrated by drugs and in 
respect of which it becomes common knowledge that its 
participants use drugs is likely to suffer substantially in its 
public image and reputation.18 
Set in this context, the Court of Queen’s Bench ruled that the restraint of 
trade imposed by the two-year ban, which was founded on the principle of 
strict liability, was indeed reasonable and proportionate and, therefore, not 
unlawful.19   
The principle of strict liability has also received appropriate endorsement 
from the CAS, which made clear as far back as 1995 in the case of USA 
Shooting & Q. v. Union Internationale de Tir20 that “[t]he fact that the [CAS] 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 4. 
18. Id. at 15.  
19. Id. at 16. 
20. See generally USA Shooting & Q. v. Union Int’l de Tir, CAS 94/A/129, (May 23, 1995). 
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has sympathy for the principle of a strict liability rule obviously does not allow 
the CAS to create such a rule where it does not exist.”21 
Quite clearly, the policy of strict liability can sometimes lead to unjust 
results.22  However, without a doubt, the policy was implemented for very 
specific reasons, which were aptly summed up by the CAS in USA Shooting & 
Q.: 
It is true that a strict liability test is likely in some sense to be 
unfair in an individual case . . . where the Athlete may have 
taken medication as the result of [mislabeling] or faulty advice 
for which he or she is not responsible . . . . But it is also in 
some sense “unfair” for an athlete to get food poisoning on the 
eve of an important competition.  Yet in neither case will the 
rules of the competition be altered to undo the unfairness.  
Just as the competition will not be postponed to await the 
athlete’s recovery, so the prohibition of banned substance will 
not be lifted in recognition of its accidental absorption.  The 
vicissitudes of competition, like those of life generally, may 
create many types of unfairness, whether by accident or the 
negligence of unaccountable persons, which the law cannot 
repair. . . . Furthermore, it appears to be a laudable policy 
objective not to repair an accidental unfairness to an 
individual by creating an intentional unfairness to the whole 
body of other competitors.  This is what would happen if 
banned performance-enhancing substances were tolerated 
when absorbed inadvertently.  Moreover, it is likely that even 
intentional abuse would in many cases escape sanction for 
lack of proof of guilty intent. And it is certain that a 
requirement of intent would invite costly litigation that may 
well cripple federations . . . .23 
That pillar, upon which anti-doping control stands, remains in place today.  
Although it is clear that strict liability is of fundamental importance in anti-
doping policies, it has come as no surprise that strict liability has been aided in 
recent years by further provisions that have filled in the gaps left by strict 
liability.  Quite obviously, without the smoking gun of a failed drug test, strict 
21. Id. at ¶ 1.  
22. For example, Alain Baxter and Andrea Raducan both lost Olympic medals, while arguably 
being blameless for the failed tests that caused the loss of those medals. 
23. USA Shooting, CAS 94/A/129, ¶¶ 14–15.  
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liability is a weapon incapable of finding its target.  This weakness was best 
demonstrated in the events surrounding the Bay Area Laboratory Co-
Operative (BALCO) scandal.24  If a sporting authority does not have an 
effective test for a performance-enhancing substance, then strict liability 
becomes irrelevant.  This was the problem that the sporting authorities faced 
with the existence of tetrahydrogestrinone (THG) before any test became 
available.  The remedy for this lacuna was as predictable as it was effective.  
Nonanalytical positives were used to great effect in securing convictions 
against those benefitting from the “undetectable,” artificially-created, 
performance-enhancing drugs.25 
The case brought against Michelle Collins by the United States Anti-
Doping Agency (USADA) on December 10, 2004 was one of the first attempts 
by an anti-doping agency to secure a conviction against an athlete for taking 
performance-enhancing substances without the existence of a positive test.26  
The fact that the ruling by the arbitration panel went against Collins was not 
contentious.  The USADA panel pointed out that there was substantial 
evidence against Collins, which included documents seized from BALCO, 
incriminating e-mails, and suspicious, although not positive, blood and urine 
tests at different IOC accredited laboratories over several years.27 
The significance of nonanalytical positives, as a further pillar upon which 
doping control stands, cannot be underestimated.  Although a relatively new 
weapon in the armory of sporting authorities, nonanalytical positives have 
seen significant developments.  Richard McLaren has commented that “[p]rior 
to the cases arising from the BALCO affair, non-analytical positive cases 
before [the] CAS primarily involved an apparent manipulation or 
contamination of a sample given by an athlete as part of the doping control 
sample collection process.”28  Any attempted manipulation or contamination 
of an athlete’s sample is considered a doping offense, readily proven without 
the necessity of establishing the purity of the sample itself.29 
24. The Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO) scandal was an attempt to create the 
world’s fastest human being through the design and then use of artificially created, undetectable 
steroids.  The project succeeded when Tim Montgomery broke the world 100m record in September 
2002 running a time of 9.78 seconds.  See generally U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Montgomery, CAS 
2004/O/645, at 2 (Dec. 13, 2005). 
25. Tim Montgomery, Dwain Chambers, Chryste Gaines, Michelle Collins, Marion Jones, and 
Kelli White were just some of the athletes caught up in the BALCO scandal.  See infra note 118. 
26. See generally U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 
00658 04 (N. Am. CAS Panel Dec. 10, 2004).  
27. Id. ¶ 1.2. 
28. Richard H. McLaren, An Overview of Non-Analytical Positive and Circumstantial Evidence 
Cases in Sports, 16 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 193, 195–96 (2006).  
29. Id. at 196. 
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Article 2.2 of the Code makes it clear that use or attempted use of a 
prohibited substance is a doping violation.30  Perhaps the most obvious 
example of a successful action against an athlete charged with interfering with 
her sample was brought against Irish swimmer Michelle Smith de Bruin.31  In 
making clear the appropriate burden of proof, the CAS explained, 
In essence, the Appellant contended that the burden of proof 
lay upon the Respondent to eliminate all possibilities other 
than manipulation by the Appellant.  We do not believe that 
this position reflects a correct legal analysis.  The 
Respondent’s burden was only, but sufficiently, to make the 
Panel “comfortably satisfied” that the Appellant was the 
culprit.32 
The justification for the adoption of this standard, rather than one of 
beyond a reasonable doubt, was expressed by the CAS as being necessary to 
avoid applying standards appropriate in the “public law of the state [rather 
than] the private law of an association.”33  This standard has been specifically 
identified as being appropriate in cases involving personal reputation and 
professional misconduct and, as such, with one or two reservations identified 
elsewhere in this article, would appear to be appropriate for anti-doping 
incidents such as those being discussed.34  Further, it is this standard that has 
been adopted by WADA and therefore applies to anti-doping cases in general, 
and in particular, to Claudia Pechstein’s biological passport case.  Indeed, 
when Pechstein challenged the application of this standard, the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal (SFT) opined, 
The view of the Arbitral Tribunal that the Respondent must 
prove a doping [offense] “to the comfortable satisfaction of 
the hearing panel” does not violate public policy but refers to 
the allocation of the burden of proof and the standard of 
evidence which, in the area of application of private law—
even where disciplinary measures of private sporting 
[organizations] are under review—cannot be determined from 
30. WADA CODE art. 2.2. 
31. See generally B. v. Féd’n Int’l de Natation, CAS 98/A/211, (June 7, 1999) (de Bruin was 
found guilty of tampering with her urine sample given during an out-of-competition test).   
32. Id. ¶¶ 39–40. 
33. Id. ¶ 26 (citing N., J., Y., & W. v. Féd’n Int’l de Natation, CAS 98/A/208, ¶ 13 (Dec. 22, 
1998). 
34. See Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 00658 04, ¶ 3.4.  
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the perspective of criminal law concepts such as the 
presumption of innocence or the principles of “in dubio pro 
reo” or on the basis of the guarantees which result from the 
ECHR. Even with respect to her [defense] that the standard of 
evidence on which the decision was based leads to disregard 
of the principle of proportionality, the Appellant does not 
point out a violation of public policy.35 
This article will first briefly explain the nature of the biological passport 
and why it represents a significant evolutionary development in the fight 
against doping in sports.  This article will then go on to analyze, in detail, the 
first case brought to CAS using the biological passport, specifically against 
German speed skater Claudia Pechstein.  The article will then shift to 
Pechstein’s unsuccessful appeal to the SFT against her conviction and will 
move on to consider her request for revision of that decision back to the SFT.  
This piece will end with a brief consideration of the position that the passport 
may prove to be part of the armory of measures available to the anti-doping 
organizations, which raises the question of whether it may lead to a 
fundamental shift in the emphasis of the war on doping in sports. 
II. THE BIOLOGICAL PASSPORT 
The biological passport is an individual electronic record of blood and 
urine tests taken from sports participants over an extended period of time.36  
These tests enable an individual hematological profile to be created, which 
consists of a number of different hematological parameters.37  The principle 
behind the passport is that certain drugs have an impact on these parameters, 
either raising them or lowering them, and therefore making it possible to 
detect doping without the necessity of a failed drug test.38  The individualized 
nature of the profiles increases the sensitivity of the passport, effectively using 
the athlete’s own physiology as a base rather than population norms, as is the 
case with conventional drugs tests.39 
35. See Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Tribunal] Feb. 10, 2010, 4A_612/2009 (Switz.), ¶ 6.3.2. 
36. Biological Passport – Questions/Answers, UNION CYCLISTE INT’L, http://www.uci.ch/ 
templates/ UCI/UCI2/layout.asp?MenuId=MTU4ODY&LangId=1 (last visited June 21, 2011). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. See Athlete Biological Passport, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/Science-Medicine/Athlete-Biological-Passport/ (last updated Dec. 2009); Biological 
Passport – Questions/Answers, supra note 36. 
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The SFT’s recent ruling in Pechstein v. International Skating Union40, 
which confirmed the decision of the CAS against Pechstein,41 seems to have 
added yet another string to the bow of the sporting authorities against doping 
users.  Although the International Skating Union (ISU) has been at the 
forefront of the development of the biological passport, it is not the only 
international sporting authority that has been pushing the development of the 
technology.  The International Cycling Union (UCI) introduced its own 
biological passport at the start of the 2008 season.42  After some initial 
problems and disagreements with WADA, which at one point led WADA to 
withdraw its support for UCI’s program,43 the UCI declared that five cyclists 
needed to respond to doping allegations after submitting abnormal results 
under the new testing program.44  Thus, WADA imposed the first sanction of 
a sports participant caught using the biological passport on May 28, 2010, 
which led to its Director General stating that 
“The Athlete Biological Passport adds a powerful tool to 
support the fight against doping in sport . . . . Coupled with 
other strategies, it makes prohibited preparations harder to 
implement by those athletes who may take the risk to cheat.  
We know that the effects of some substances remain 
detectable in the body longer than the substances themselves.  
The Athlete Biological Passport Model allows the anti-doping 
community to exploit this reality through a similar approach 
to that used in forensic science. . . . We look forward to seeing 
more anti-doping organizations follow in the UCI’s footsteps 
and implement such longitudinal follow-up programs in the 
comings [sic] months and years.”45 
The UCI followed the sanction with notable success with the CAS, which 
40. See generally Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009. 
41. See generally Arbitral Award, Pechstein v. Int’l Skating Union, CAS 2009/A/1912 & 
Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft e.V.v v. Int’l Skating Union, CAS 2009/A/1913 (Nov. 25, 
2009).  
42. See Has Peloton Cleaned Up Its Act or Will Dirty Tactics Prevail?, SUN. TIMES (London) 
(July 4, 2008) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/more_sport/cycling/article4264752.ece. 
43. Julien Pretot, WADA Withdraws Support for UCI Biological Passport, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 
2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2784271420080327. 
44. Gregor Brown, UCI Names First Five Biological Passport Violators, CYCLING NEWS (June 
17, 2009), http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/uci-names-first-five-biological-passport-violators.  
45. WADA Welcomes First Athlete Biological Passport Sanction, WADA, (May 28, 2010), 
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/News-Center/Articles/WADA-Welcomes-First-Athlete-Biological-
Passport-Sanction/.  
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confirmed the rigor of the biological passport in detecting doping violations, 
which was highlighted in recent decisions rendered by the CAS against Pietro 
Caucchioli,46 Franco Pellizotti,47 and Tadej Valjavec.48 
On December 1, 2009, WADA approved new Athlete Biological Passport 
Operating Guidelines, which stated very clearly that “[t]he fundamental 
principle of the Athlete Biological Passport is based on the monitoring of an 
athlete’s biological variables over time to facilitate indirect detection of 
doping on a longitudinal basis, rather than on the traditional direct detection of 
doping.”49 
At the same time, in the United Kingdom, several British athletes were 
placed on the biological passport program, which required them to submit 
blood samples throughout their careers.50  The key to the biological passport 
lies not in what it tests, but how it tests, as Professor David Cowan51 
commented: 
“This new [program] will compare the athlete with himself or 
herself rather than against the population at large. The effect 
of this will make it far easier to catch the doped athlete. We 
believe that this will act as a powerful deterrent for the good 
of all healthy athletes and maintain the integrity of sport.”52 
The notion of effectively measuring against the athlete’s own physiology 
rather than standard population norms is nothing new.  A similar provision 
was explained in Collins as being critical in the finding of guilt, with reference 
to levels of testosterone and epitestosterone.53  The USADA Panel stated, 
A normal T/E ratio is 1/1, although the specific ratio will vary 
from person to person.  The [Code] sets an abnormal T/E ratio 
at 6/1, which is above what one would expect normally to 
46. See generally Caucchioli v. Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano & Union Cycliste 
Internationale, CAS 2010/A/2178 (Mar. 8, 2011) (unofficial translation of original French text). 
47. See generally Pellizotti v. Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano & Union Cycliste 
Internationale, TAS 2010/A/2308 & Union Cycliste Internationale v. Pellizotti, Federazione Ciclistica 
Italiana, & Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano, TAS 2011, 2011/A/2335 (June 14, 2011). 
48. See generally Union Cycliste Internationale v. Valjavec, CAS 2010/A/2235 (Apr. 21, 2011).  
49. Athlete Biological Passport, supra note 39.  
50. See U.K. Anti-Doping Introduces Athlete Biological Passport, U.K. ANTI-DOPING, 
http://www.ukad.org.uk/ news/athlete-biological-passport (last visited June 28, 2010). 
51. Director of the King’s College London Drug Control Centre, the only accredited anti-doping 
laboratory in the United Kingdom. 
52. U.K. Anti-Doping Introduces Athlete Biological Passport, supra note 50. 
53. See Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 00658 04, ¶ 2.3. 
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occur. Regardless of a person’s own baseline ratio, his or her 
ratio will generally stay consistent, with a normal variation in 
women of up to 60%.  The variation in Collins’s T/E ratio in 
2003 alone, on the other hand, was more than 1000%.54 
Despite the obvious benefits that may be derived from focusing testing on 
athletes against themselves, which were explained in Collins and are very 
much a feature of the biological passport, the administration of the passport 
scheme itself has not been universally welcomed by all of those involved in 
the fight against doping.  In what may be seen as more of an attack on the UCI 
rather than on the biological passport, Pierre Bordry,55 at a recent anti-doping 
symposium, stated, “‘I [do not] think the biological passport is useful . . . . 
What we need is neutral information on biological data.  And we need a 
biological passport that is absolutely transparent to target riders.  Everybody 
should deserve the same treatment.’”56 
It is apparent, however, that the biological passport is here to stay.  In 
Pechstein,57 CAS confirmed its satisfaction with the technology and its 
practice, a decision that the SFT affirmed.58 
III. CAS 2009/A/1912 CLAUDIA PECHSTEIN V. INTERNATIONAL SKATING 
UNION 
A. Background 
Claudia Pechstein has been competing at the elite level of speed skating 
since 1988.59  During that time, she has taken part in five Olympic Games, 
winning five gold, and numerous other medals during her career.60  As has 
already been stated, along with the UCI, the ISU has been at the forefront of 
developing the biological passport to combat doping in its respective sport.  
Both organizations adopted the biological passport measure before it received 
54. Id. ¶ 4.18. 
55. French Anti-Doping Agency President 
56. Samuel Petrequin, French Anti-Doping Agency President Pierre Bordry Criticizes UCI’s 
Biological Passport, THE GAEA TIMES (June 10, 2010), http://blog.taragana.com/business/ 
2010/06/10/french-anti-doping-agency-president-pierre-bordry-criticizes-ucis-biological-passport-
69294/. 
57. See generally Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf 
Gemeinschaft e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913. 
58. See generally Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009. 
59. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft 
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 1. 
60. Id. 
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formal backing from WADA, and it was against this background that blood 
samples from Pechstein were analyzed and found to display evidence of a 
possible doping violation, which became the subject of first, a case brought to 
the CAS,61 and then second, the final appeal to the SFT.62  
For a period of just over nine years, running from February 2000 until 
April 2009, Pechstein, in common with many other skaters of her caliber, 
underwent numerous drug tests, and, during this time, she never once failed 
any such test.63  Over ninety blood samples were collected from her to be used 
to aid development of her biological passport.64  Collection of these samples 
accelerated between October 2007 and April 2009, with twenty-seven samples 
collected, including twelve in the final four months of that period.65  The CAS 
explained the parameters that are measured from the samples: 
The blood parameters [that] are measured and recorded within 
the scope of the Respondent’s blood profiling program 
include inter alia hemoglobin, hematocrit and percentage of 
reticulocytes, (“%retics”).  Reticulocytes are immature red 
blood cells that are released from the bone marrow.  The 
%retics is a sensitive hematological parameter which provides 
a real-time assessment of the functional state of 
erythropoiesis66 in a person’s organism.67 
It was on the percentage of reticulocytes that Pechstein’s readings proved 
to be problematic.  The CAS pointed out that the ISU considered that normal 
values fell between 0.4 and 2.4.68  Although Pechstein’s profile, which 
resulted from her blood samples in isolation, may not have been particularly 
serious, it was the pattern produced that proved to be damning.  Just one day 
before a major championship, a sample taken on February 6, 2009 showed a 
%retic reading of 3.49.69  Two more readings were taken on the first day of 
61. See generally id. 
62. See generally Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009. 
63. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft 
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 5. 
64. Id. ¶ 6. 
65. Id. 
66. Red blood cell production—a very important feature for endurance athletes in particular. 
67. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft 
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 7. 
68. Id. ¶ 8. This was disputed by Pechstein; however, Pechstein’s criticism of this interpretation 
was rejected by the CAS. 
69. Id. ¶ 9. 
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the championship, and those readings were 3.54 and 3.38, respectively.70  Just 
over a week later, another sample was taken, which showed that her reading 
had dropped to 1.37.71  By that time, Pechstein was an athlete approaching the 
veteran stage of her career, a time when a natural decline may be expected in 
her performance.  Further concerns were also raised about the frequency with 
which Pechstein had changed her “whereabouts”72 in January and February of 
2009.  Pechstein’s movement made it very difficult to apply any “out-of-
competition” testing on her.73  Following a review of Pechstein’s profile on 
March 5, 2009, the ISU accused her of violating Article 2.2 of its anti-doping 
code,74 which conformed to the new WADA code that came into effect 
January 1, 2009.75  The ISU Disciplinary Committee subsequently imposed a 
two-year ban on Pechstein, commencing February 9, 2009, which Pechstein 
then appealed to the CAS.76   
Pechstein, unsurprisingly, denied the allegations, citing concerns about the 
timings involved in the procedure.77  She pointed out that, despite being tested 
on numerous occasions, she had never failed a drug test.78  She also suggested 
that she had not given her express written permission or consent to use any 
evidence of blood doping.79  She stressed her position that the ISU had not 
complied with relevant WADA standards on testing, chain of custody, or 
documentation of results.80  Perhaps her most significant defense, however, 
certainly from the perspective of the future use of the biological passport, was 
her assertion that the upper limit for %retics proscribed by the ISU (i.e., 2.4) 
was far too low, and that it was perfectly normal for a healthy woman to have 
a reading fluctuating between 0.8 and 4.1%retics.81  Further, Pechstein 
asserted that her %retics readings had always remained above the 0.5 that 
70. Id. ¶ 10. 
71. Id. ¶¶ 8–11. 
72. There is a requirement upon an elite sports participant to provide whereabouts for one hour 
each day, between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. for the purposes of out-of-competition testing.  
73. See Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft 
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913 at ¶ 68. 
74. Namely using the prohibited method of blood doping in violation of article 2.2, (Use or 
attempted use by an athlete of a prohibited method or prohibited substance). See id. ¶ 12. 
75. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009 at 3. 
76. Id. at 4. 
77. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft 
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 48. 
78. Id. ¶ 46. 
79. Id. ¶ 47. 
80. Id. ¶ 48.  
81. Id. ¶ 49. 
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should normally be expected following a period of erythropoietin abuse.82  
She also questioned the accuracy of the machine used to measure the %retics 
and the reliability of the sampling.83  Moreover, Pechstein also cast doubt 
upon the accuracy of the %retics measurement when set in context of both her 
hemoglobin and hematocrit levels.84  In short, she questioned the reliability 
and accuracy of the whole procedure around the samples taken for the 
longitudinal testing, which led to her violation of the ISU anti-doping code.  
Her final point related to the burden of proof to be expected of the ISU in 
proving a doping violation.  She suggested, as the CAS pointed out, “that the 
ISU must convince the Panel to a level very close to ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ that all alternative causes for the increase of %retics can be excluded 
and that, additionally, the [a]thlete had an intention to use blood doping.”85 
In contrast, it was the ISU’s contention that because Pechstein had been 
charged with use of a prohibited substance or method rather than attempted 
use, under Article 2.2 of the ISU anti-doping regulations, it was unnecessary 
for ISU to prove any such intent to use blood doping.86  
Following confirmation that the CAS had jurisdiction to hear and decide 
the dispute, pursuant to Article R47 of the CAS Code and Article 13.2.1 of the 
ISU anti-doping regulations,87 the CAS went on to explain that in accordance 
with Article R57 of the CAS Code, “[t]he Panel shall have full power to 
review the facts and the law.”88  This meant, of course, that the panel could 
look at the case in detail rather than just examine the correctness of the 
original decision, looking at both procedural and substantive issues.89  This 
was especially important as new issues for the CAS were being examined with 
the reliability of the biological passport program.  Pechstein, it should not be 
forgotten had not failed any drugs tests, neither in competition nor out of 
competition.90  There was some relevant precedent from the United States,91 
as was pointed out by the Panel,92 but nevertheless these were new issues for 
82. Id. ¶ 50.  
83. Id. 
84. Id. ¶ 52. 
85. Id. ¶ 53. 
86. See id. ¶ 69. 
87. See id. ¶¶ 71–72. 
88. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT CODE R57 (2011) [hereinafter CAS CODE]. 
89. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft 
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 79. 
90. See id. ¶ 46. 
91. See generally Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 00658 04. 
92. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft 
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 78 (citing Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 00658 04). 
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the CAS. 
An interesting argument raised by Pechstein related to, as she saw it, her 
lack of consent to the use, by the ISU, of her blood samples as evidence of 
blood doping.93  In raising this point, Pechstein seemed to be suggesting one 
of two possible arguments.  The first being that the ISU rules were unclear as 
to whether her samples could be used to test for blood doping, and, therefore, 
any perceived ambiguity should be resolved in accordance with the decision in 
Wilander v. Tobin,94 which is construed in favor of the athlete.  This issue was 
not explored, as Pechstein instead concentrated on the argument that there was 
a clear lack of agreement that her samples should be used in the manner that 
the ISU had used them.  In Pechstein’s case, the CAS concluded on this 
particular issue: 
Ms[.] Pechstein has been participating in “international 
activities” for more than two decades.  In willingly registering 
for international skating competitions sanctioned by the ISU, 
she obviously expressed her acceptance of ISU rules and 
regulations, including the ISU [Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR)]. . . . When they accede to competition, athletes cannot 
pick and choose the rules they like; accordingly, the Panel 
finds that Ms. Pechstein has been at all times during her 
international career under an obligation to comply with all 
ISU regulations, including all applicable anti-doping rules.95 
Additionally, Pechstein’s agreement with the anti-doping rules was 
reinforced by the fact that she never objected to any sample collection, and, 
further, she actually signed each form or barcode used to identify her own 
particular blood samples.96  The CAS could discern no ambiguity in ISU’s 
anti-doping regulations and, to the contrary, stressed that 
Article 6.2 of the ISU ADR expressly authorizes the ISU to 
use blood samples to “detect” a prohibited method and more 
specifically, to create a profile from the relevant parameters in 
a skater’s blood “for [a]nti-[d]oping purposes”  thus 
including a finding of “use” under Article 2.2 of the ISU 
93. See id. ¶ 95. 
94. See generally Wilander v. Tobin & Jude, [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 293 (Eng.). 
95. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft 
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶¶ 98–99. 
96. Id. ¶ 137. 
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ADR.97  
The CAS’ position was further reinforced by the WADA guidelines on 
blood sample collection, which state that such longitudinal profiling can be 
used for “anti doping purposes in accordance with Article 2.2 of the Code.”98  
Pechstein also raised concerns about using blood profiling to prove an 
anti-doping violation, suggesting that it was only on January 1, 2009, that the 
new WADA and ISU anti-doping regulations came into force and that the use 
of longitudinal profiling for this purpose was expressly stated in the ISU 
ADR.99  She therefore suggested that using any of her samples prior to that 
date would effectively amount to retroactive punishment,100 which is 
forbidden by the ISU ADR and also by Swiss law, under which the CAS and 
the ISU operate.  The CAS, however, clearly stated that Pechstein’s 
longitudinal profile (i.e., her biological passport) provided sufficient evidence 
for a breach of Article 2.2 of the ISU ADR, and that this interpretation was 
perfectly possible under both the old and the new ISU ADR.101  The 2009 ISU 
ADR made it clear that an anti-doping violation under Article 2.2, “Use or 
Any Use,” could always be demonstrated by “any reliable evidentiary means” 
under the old or the new regulations, and, therefore, there was no concern 
about any issues of retroactive punishment.102   
Interestingly, the CAS further emphasized that the only concerns with 
regard to the use of old samples may be if the samples fall outside the 
appropriate eight-year limitation period.  As the CAS stated, “[a]s long as the 
substantive rule sanctioning a given conduct as doping is in force prior to the 
conduct, the resort to a new evidentiary method does not constitute a case of 
retrospective application of the law.”103 
This rule has to be appropriate with the offense clearly defined and the 
samples collected.  This in no way could be viewed as retroactive punishment, 
but merely a necessity for further scientific analysis using more complex and 
up-to-date methods on samples already collected.  This approach was later 
confirmed in Caucchioli v. CONI, where the CAS reiterated that the biological 
passport 
97. Id. ¶ 101. 
98. Id. ¶ 102.  
99. Id. ¶ 104 (citing ISU ADR 5.3.1). 
100. Id. ¶ 47. 
101. Id. ¶ 107. 
102. Id.  It was also pointed out that her readings prior to January 1, 2009 were used only to 
assist in interpreting the samples from February 2009, which were the relevant samples in proving her 
anti-doping violation under Article 2.2.  Id. ¶ 109. 
103. Id. ¶ 109. 
CHARLISH (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2011  2:17 PM 
76 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:1 
 
represents only a new method for screening of blood doping, 
already prohibited by other standards.  New scientific 
methods . . .  may be used at any time to prove that past 
abuses, with the only restrictions on the term of use samples 
for the fight against doping (set at eight years) and the 
beginning disciplinary procedures in a timely manner. . . . 
Therefore, the use of new methods do not constitute a case of 
retroactive application of standards . . . .104 
What was rightly of more concern to the CAS was the question of whether 
longitudinal blood profiling could be interpreted as a “reliable means” for 
testing.  Was the scientific basis of longitudinal profiling sufficiently robust to 
enable a clear and categorical judgment of whether an anti-doping violation 
under Article 2.2 had taken place?  This fundamental point, the CAS 
suggested, could be broken down into five distinct questions, each of which 
must be proven: (1) Were the relevant blood samples properly taken?; (2) Was 
there a reliable chain of custody of the samples from collection to the 
laboratory?; (3)Was the analysis machine accurate and reliable?; (4) Was the 
transmission of the samples to and from their storage in the ISU data base 
reliable?; and (5) Was it clear that “the hematological values of Ms[.] 
Pechstein are reliable evidence of her use of a prohibited method in violation 
of Article 2.2 of the ISU ADR?”105 
It was made clear by the CAS that no presumption should be made about 
the reliability of the analysis machine;106 that they were satisfied that the 
samples were properly collected;107 that the number of tests analyzed was 
appropriate;108 that the chain of custody was safe, secure, and scientifically 
sound;109 and that the analysis machine and methods of analysis were reliable.  
It was made clear that all of the aforementioned questions had to be, and could 
be, established according to the appropriate standard of proof.  It was 
confirmed by the CAS that this case involved an offense of strict liability, 
meaning that no fault or negligence in the commission of the anti-doping 
violation had to be proven by the ISU on the part of Pechstein.110  
104. Caucchioli, 2010/A/2178, ¶¶ 33–34. 
105. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft 
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 113. 
106. Id. ¶ 114. 
107. Id. ¶ 138. 
108. Id. ¶ 180. 
109. Id. ¶ 148. 
110. Id. ¶ 119 (citing ISU ADR 2.2.1, 2.2.2). 
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The more interesting question concerned the appropriate standard of proof 
that was required to demonstrate the doping violation.  Pechstein asserted, 
bearing in mind the particular seriousness of the allegation against her, that the 
allegation needs to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.111  However, the 
CAS emphasized that the appropriate standard was that of “comfortable 
satisfaction . . . bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation” as per the 
ISU ADR.112  
This measure had been adopted by WADA in 2003 and has been 
examined in some detail in case law since.  It was reported in Collins113 that 
the standard originated from “court decisions in Australia and other 
Commonwealth countries that created a standard for cases involving personal 
reputation more stringent than [the] balance of probabilities but less 
burdensome than beyond a reasonable doubt.”114 
Like the Pechstein case, the case of Michelle Collins also involved an 
athlete accused of doping but had not actually failed a drug test.  Evidence 
from e-mail correspondence and analysis of blood and urine samples displayed 
tell-tale signs of doping by Collins.115  In at least this respect, it can be 
suggested that the two cases bear striking similarities.  However, in Pechstein, 
the comfortable satisfaction standard was breached without the benefit of a 
trail of damning e-mail evidence.  Rather, in Pechstein, there was data from 
Pechstein’s blood samples to rely upon.116  The link between the professional 
misconduct cases involving personal reputation, as alluded to above, is the 
forerunner to the imposed standard, and, thus, cases involving doping in 
sports, perhaps, invite some caution.  Reputation lost through a professional 
misconduct case will invariably have consequences only at a local level and is 
unlikely to have significant impact beyond one’s own domestic and 
professional life.  However, for a high-profile athlete to be found guilty of a 
doping offense, with or without the smoking gun of a failed test, has grave 
consequences at a domestic level and goes far beyond to a national and 
international level.  This impact will also encroach beyond an athlete’s 
immediate professional environment.  A “drug cheat” will lose the chance to 
earn income in related industries, such as coaching or media work.  Likewise, 
publicity surrounding his or her “conviction” is likely to be of national or 
111. Id. ¶ 53. 
112. Id. ¶ 123 (quoting ISU ADR 3.1). 
113. See generally Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 00658 04.  
114. Id. ¶ 3.4.  
115. Id. ¶ 4.3. 
116. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft 
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 210. 
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international interest, and, therefore, the damage to his or her reputation may 
be that much more severe.  Thus, it is crucial that the comfortable satisfaction 
test truly does reflect these circumstances.  Just as negligence in sports is 
predicated on the importance of ordinary negligence taking into account all the 
circumstances,117 it is important in the world of anti-doping that the 
circumstances remain fundamental.  Where the consequences of a guilty 
verdict are potentially more severe, then the burden of proof should rise to 
reflect these more serious consequences.  The fact that this notion has been 
expressly acknowledged in several cases118 should reassure those who may be 
concerned that there is the potential to find an athlete guilty and to impose a 
significant penalty by merely overcoming a burden of proof, which may, at 
first glance, appear to be very low.  This is not the case, particularly when the 
serious consequences and impact on the level of proof that any panel may 
require to demonstrate a doping violation are both taken into consideration.  
Significantly, the standard of comfortable satisfaction has also withstood 
scrutiny from the SFT.119  
Therefore, the key issue is being able to define the limits of what may be 
meant by comfortable satisfaction.  On paper, it appears to be at the midway 
point between the civil burden of balance of probabilities and the criminal 
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, the reality may be 
somewhat different.  This particular argument was rehearsed in the cases of 
United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Gaines120 and in United States Anti-
Doping Agency v. Montgomery.121  In Gaines, CAS almost seemed to dismiss 
concern about the appropriate standard of proof to be applied, suggesting, 
As often becomes evident when the question of standard of 
proof is debated, the debate looms larger in theory than 
practice. . . . In all cases the degree of probability must be 
commensurate with and proportionate to those allegations; the 
more serious the allegation the higher the degree of 
probability, or “comfort” required.  That is because, in 
general, the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that 
117. See Caldwell v. MaGuire, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1054 (Eng.), ¶ 39. 
118. See generally Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf 
Gemeinschaft e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913; Arbitral Award, U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Gaines, CAS 
2004/O/649 (Dec. 13, 2005); Arbitral Award, Edwards v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS OG 
04/003 (Aug. 17, 2004); Montgomery, CAS 2004/O/645. 
119. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 3 (It is the standard adopted by the WADA and is laid out 
clearly in Article 3 of the 2009 WADA Code). 
120. See generally Arbitral Award, Gaines, CAS 2004/O/649. 
121. See generally Montgomery, CAS 2004/O/645. 
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the alleged event occurred and, hence, the stronger the 
evidence required before the occurrence of the event is 
demonstrated to be more probable than not.122 
The CAS Panel made the point in Gaines that at times, allegations may be 
grave and have very harsh consequences, such as the loss of livelihood and 
reputation, and because these allegations would have very severe 
consequences if proven means that for the CAS to be comfortably satisfied, 
the evidence and proof must be very clear.  Under such circumstances, the 
CAS suggested that the practical difference between beyond reasonable doubt 
and comfortable satisfaction was minimal.  In Gaines, the CAS concluded on 
this matter: 
From this perspective, and in view of the nature and gravity of 
the allegations at issue in these proceedings, there is no 
practical distinction between the standards of proof advocated 
by USADA and the Respondents.  It makes little, if indeed 
any, difference whether a “beyond reasonable doubt” or 
“comfortable satisfaction” standard is applied to determine the 
claims against the Respondents.123 
This argument bears the hallmarks presented in the English football 
hooliganism case of Gough v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire.124  In Gough, 
the appellant argued that if a banning order125 was a punishment then it must 
be predicated on a beyond reasonable doubt burden of proof rather than 
reasonable belief as outlined in the legislation.126  The English court dismissed 
this argument, suggesting that the standard to be applied, which would have 
been familiar to both Pechstein and Gaines, would be practically 
indistinguishable from the criminal, beyond reasonable doubt standard.  Lord 
Phillips MR commented on such banning orders: 
While technically the civil standard of proof applies, that 
standard is flexible and must reflect the consequences that will 
122. Arbitral Award, Gaines, CAS 2004/O/649, ¶36. 
123. Id. 
124. See generally Gough v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002] EWCA (Civ) 351 (Eng.). 
125. A penalty imposed upon football fans that could prevent them from travelling abroad or 
from the vicinity of particular football grounds if the court was satisfied that there were reasonable 
grounds for believing that making a banning order would help prevent violence or disorder at a 
regulated football match. See id. ¶ 86. 
126. See id. ¶ 41; see generally Football Spectators Act of 1989 (Eng. 2002). 
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follow if the case for a banning order is made out.  This 
should lead the [justices] to apply an exacting standard of 
proof that will, in practice, be hard to distinguish from the 
criminal standard . . . . In practice the “reasonable grounds” 
will almost inevitably consist of evidence of past conduct. . . . 
Those requirements, if properly applied in the manner 
described above, will provide a satisfactory threshold for the 
making of a banning order.127 
One may question whether this reasonable satisfaction standard, albeit one 
that in the English court’s mind is apparently similar to the criminal standard, 
is sufficiently rigorous when set against the severity of any drug ban.  A guilty 
verdict obtained through use of the biological passport will almost certainly be 
able to demonstrate a pattern of drug abuse, whereas a failed test merely 
demonstrates that the athlete was guilty on that particular occasion.  Therefore, 
with this in mind, a pattern of abuse will clearly be viewed as more serious 
than any single transgression.  It is also more likely that such a pattern of 
abuse will fall foul of aggravating circumstances outlined in Article 10.6 of the 
Code.128  Comment to Article 10.6 in the Code states, 
Examples of aggravating circumstances which may justify the 
imposition of a period of Ineligibility greater than the standard 
sanction are: the Athlete or other Person committed the anti-
doping rule violation as part of a doping plan or scheme, 
either individually or involving a conspiracy or common 
enterprise to commit anti-doping rule violations; the Athlete 
or other Person Used or Possessed multiple Prohibited 
Substances or Prohibited Methods or Used or Possessed a 
Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method on multiple 
occasions . . . .129 
This is, by no means, a definitive list of circumstances that may lead to a 
finding of aggravating circumstances.  It is clear, however, that use of a 
prohibited method or substance on multiple occasions will be enough to satisfy 
Article 10.6 of the Code.  It is also clear that the use of the biological passport 
is much more likely to detect multiple uses than in-competition or out-of-
competition testing.  Does this raise questions of equity in the Code, 
127. Gough, ¶¶ 90, 92–93.  
128. See generally WADA CODE art. 10.6. 
129. WADA CODE art. 10.6 cmt. 
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particularly when there has not been a universal adoption of the biological 
passport in all sports governed by the Code?  Should the burden of proof 
remain, overtly at least, one of reasonable satisfaction when the consequences 
are potentially much more serious for the athlete running afoul through the 
biological passport standard than through more conventional testing?  
In Claudia Pechstein’s case, the CAS confirmed that she was guilty of a 
doping violation according to Article 2.2 of the ISU ADR, and, pursuant to 
Article 10.2 of the same regulations, she was declared ineligible from 
competition for two years.130 
B. The Appeal to the Swiss Federal Tribunal131 
Following Pechstein’s defeat with the CAS, she launched her final appeal 
in the SFT.132  In her submission, the major thrust of her appeal was that the 
CAS Secretary General and other unnamed third parties had unfairly 
influenced the CAS decision.133  Pechstein was denied an extensive judicial 
review of the CAS decision in line with appropriate federal statutes, which 
restrict the scope of judicial review of international arbitration proceedings.134  
In a ruling that proved fairly damning to Pechstein’s appeal, the SFT 
resoundingly rejected her challenge of the factual findings by the CAS, 
reporting, “[a]t various points as in her further grounds for appeal, [Pechstein] 
deviates from the factual findings of the CAS or widens them without 
asserting any substantiated exceptions to the binding character of the factual 
findings.  To that extent, her submissions must remain unheeded.”135   
Pechstein’s attempts to introduce new evidence were also similarly 
rejected,136 with the SFT stressing that this in no way violated her right to be 
heard.137  “[I]n arbitration proceedings, as in civil proceedings, the parties 
cannot submit new allegations and evidence at any time and without 
restriction.  This does not constitute a violation of the right to be heard but is 
130. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft 
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶¶ 211–214. 
131. See generally Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009. 
132. The CAS is based in Lausanne and the Swiss Federal Tribunal acts as the final Court of 
Appeal for decisions rendered by the CAS. 
133. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009 at 7.  
134. Id. ¶ 2.4.1. 
135. Id. ¶ 2.4.2 (footnote omitted). 
136. Id. ¶ 5.2. 
137. See LOI FÉDÉRAL SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [LDIP] [FED. CODE ON PRIVATE 
INT’L LAW] [CPIL] Dec. 18, 1987, art. 190(2)(d) (Switz.). 
CHARLISH (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2011  2:17 PM 
82 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:1 
 
in line with generally [recognized] procedural principles.”138 
The main thrust of Pechstein’s appeal, however, concerned the CAS itself 
and its independence.139  She based an interesting argument around the 
inevitable and, as she saw it, negative outcome of her CAS hearing.  Pechstein 
suggested that there was clear pressure on the IOC to prove its opposition to 
doping to its major sponsors, and, in order to accomplish this goal, the CAS 
needed to demonstrate the accuracy and reliability of the doping passport.140  
Therefore, Pechstein suggested that being found guilty by the CAS was 
unsurprising and that her guilty verdict was greeted enthusiastically by the 
IOC Vice President, who stated, “‘the decision of the CAS shows that sports 
law is opening up more possibilities in the fight against doping in athletes than 
state law was ever able to.’”141 
The thrust of the appeal appears to have been an attempt to reignite a 
debate that had been settled as far back as 1992 in an appeal from a CAS 
decision,142 which was subsequently appealed to the SFT in March 1993.143  
In that case, a horse jockey was initially suspended for three months and fined 
when his horse tested positive for a banned substance, which he then appealed 
to the CAS.144  At arbitration, the CAS reduced the suspension to just one 
month.145  However, despite the reduction, the jockey appealed the decision to 
the SFT, alleging that the CAS was not sufficiently impartial and independent 
due to its close relationship, including financing, with the IOC.146  Although 
the SFT dismissed this case, it noted its concern that there were numerous 
links between the CAS and the IOC: the CAS was financed almost entirely by 
the IOC, the IOC had authority to modify the CAS statutes, and the IOC 
retained a large degree of influence in appointing the CAS arbitrators.147  The 
SFT commented, in obiter, 
[C]ertain objections with regard to the independence of the 
138. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 5.2. 
139. See Caucchioli, 2010/A/2178, ¶¶ 45–47 (Pietro Caucchioli attempted unsuccessfully to 
highlight the lack of impartiality of the experts used by the UCI to analyze data for the biological 
passport).  
140. See Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 3.1.1. 
141. Id. 
142. See generally Gundel v. Int’l Equestrian Fed’n, CAS 92/A/63 (Sept. 10, 1992). 
143. See generally Gundel v. Int’l Equestrian Fed’n, FT 1993 RECUEIL DES SENTENCES DU TAS 
[DIGEST OF COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT AWARDS] (1986–1998), at 561. 
144. Id. at 563. 
145. Id. at 564. 
146. See id. at 569–70. 
147. See id.  
CHARLISH (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2011  2:17 PM 
2011] THE BIOLOGICAL PASSPORT  83 
 
CAS could not be set aside without another form of process, 
in particular those based on the organic and economic ties 
existing between the CAS and the IOC.  In fact the latter is 
competent to modify the CAS Statute; it also bears the 
operating cost of this court and plays a considerable role in the 
appointment of its members.148 
The CAS has taken to discuss its own history, noting, 
In the view of the [SFT], such links would have been 
sufficient seriously to call into question the independence of 
the CAS in the event of the IOC’s being a party to 
proceedings before it.  The [SFT’s] message was thus 
perfectly clear: the CAS had to be made more independent of 
the IOC both [organizationally] and financially.149   
Following this criticism of the relationship between the CAS and IOC, the 
CAS made changes to its constitution with the aim of remedying the obiter 
comments of the SFT.150 
It was not until May 2003 that the issue of the impartiality of the CAS was 
examined in detail by the SFT and these changes were tested.151  The case 
involved two Russian cross-country skiers152 who finished first and second, 
respectively, in the five-kilometer pursuit event at the 2002 Winter 
Olympics.153  Although they passed their doping tests immediately after the 
event, both subsequently failed a later test following another cross-country 
event at the same Olympic Games.154  The athlete who finished third in the 
pursuit event appealed to CAS and was awarded the gold medal.155  The 
Russian skiers took their case to the SFT, and the SFT proceeded to dissect the 
relationship between the IOC and the CAS and examine the impartiality of the 
CAS, concluding that the CAS was not 
148. Id.  
149. History of the CAS, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/ 
infogenerales. asp/4-3-236-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2010). 
150. See Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Tribunal] May 27, 2003, 4P_267–70/2002, ¶ 3.3.1. 
(Switz.). 
151. See generally id. 
152. Olga Danilova and Larissa Lazutina 
153. See Tribunal fédéral, 4P_267–70/2002, ¶ 2.2. 
154. Id. at A.b. 
155. This was the first time an Olympic gold medal had changed hands following a decision by 
the CAS. 
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the vassal of the IOC . . . .  
. . . . 
. . . There appears to be no viable alternative to this institution, 
which can resolve international sports-related disputes quickly 
and inexpensively.  Certainly, the plaintiffs have not 
suggested one.  The CAS, with its current structure, can 
undoubtedly be improved. . . . Having gradually built up the 
trust of the sporting world, this institution which is now 
widely [recognized] and which will soon celebrate its 
twentieth birthday, remains one of the principal mainstays of 
[organized] sport.156 
The merit of Pechstein’s impartiality claim seemed questionable and it 
was almost doomed before it started.  As was made clear by the SFT, a basic 
principle of Swiss Law is good faith, which naturally applies to arbitration 
awards before the CAS and appealed to the SFT.157  All the CAS awards and 
SFT rulings are based on Swiss contract law, which has the requirement of 
good faith as one of its guiding principles.  
The duty to act in good faith is a universally [recognized] 
principle of law that applies also in the framework of arbitral 
proceedings and is part of both substantive and procedural 
public policy . . . . The bona fides principle encompasses the 
duty to act in good faith and the prohibition of abuse of 
rights . . . . The duty to act in accordance with the 
requirements of good faith applies to both the arbitral tribunal 
and the parties . . . .158  
These rules can be excluded of course by agreement of the parties, and, 
further, if they wish to object to non-compliance with those rules, then they 
must do so immediately “otherwise they shall be deemed to have waived their 
right to object.”159  The fact that Pechstein failed to raise the issue of lack of 
impartiality at the time the CAS heard her case proved to have serious 
consequences for her appeal.  The SFT commented: 
156. Tribunal fédéral, 4P_267–70/2002, ¶ 3.3.3.3. 
157. See SWISS RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION § III, art. 15(6) (2006). 
158. TOBIAS ZUBERBÜHLER ET AL., SWISS RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: 
COMMENTARY 149 (2005) (citations omitted). 
159. Id. at 149–50. 
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The Appellant herself appealed to the CAS and signed the 
Procedural Order of September 29, 2009 without raising 
objections with respect to independence or impartiality.  
Under these circumstances it is not compatible with the 
principle of good faith to raise the issue of impartiality of the 
Arbitral Tribunal applied for the first time before the [Swiss] 
Federal Tribunal in the framework of an appeal.  The 
grievance of lack of independence of the arbitral tribunal 
asserted by the Appellant is therefore not capable of 
appeal. . . . [H]er submissions of a general nature do not give 
rise to reasonable doubts as to the independence of the CAS.  
The grievance of lack of independence of the CAS would thus 
be unsubstantiated anyway.160 
Pechstein also tried to suggest that the President of the Arbitral Tribunal 
was partial, seemingly basing her accusation on a comment that he made in 
2007 suggesting his “hard line on doping issues,” his close ties with the IOC, 
and its prominence in sports governance in Italy.161  Once more, these 
concerns were given short shrift by the SFT, as they were dismissed on the 
grounds of being too vague and lacking connection to the case at hand.162 
The SFT raised an interesting point in relation to the CAS’ refusal to allow 
Pechstein’s manager to attend the hearing.  Although, the SFT confirmed the 
CAS Rule Article R44.2, which held that “[u]nless the parties agree otherwise, 
the hearings are not public,”163 and that Pechstein failed to demonstrate to 
what extent Swiss Law governing international arbitration enabled such 
proceedings to take place in public,164 the SFT nevertheless had some unease 
about this issue, suggesting that where the athlete requests it, such hearings 
should be held in public.  Specifically, the SFT stated, 
Be this as it may, in view of the outstanding significance of 
the CAS in the field of sport, it would be desirable for a public 
hearing to be held on request by the athlete concerned with a 
view to the trust in the independence and fairness of the 
160. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶¶ 3.1.2–3.1.3. 
161. Id. ¶ 3.2. 
162. Id.  
163. CAS CODE R44.2. 
164. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 4.1. 
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decision making process.165 
It will be interesting to see whether the CAS introduces such a provision 
into its code, in much the same way that it moved to accommodate the implied 
criticisms made of its relationship with the IOC in Gundel.166 
In comprehensively dismissing the appeal, the SFT reiterated the very 
clear lines with regard to public policy,167 which Pechstein had suggested had 
been violated by the award against her. 
The material adjudication of a dispute violates public policy 
only when it ignores some fundamental legal principles and is 
therefore plainly inconsistent with the fundamental, widely 
recognized system of values, which according to the 
prevailing opinions in Switzerland, should be the basis of any 
legal order.  Among such principles are: the fidelity to 
contracts (pacta sunt servanda), the prohibition of abuse of 
rights, the principle of good faith, the prohibition of 
expropriation without compensation, the prohibition of 
discrimination and the protection of incapables.168 
 Although these particular principles, upon which the central pillars of 
Swiss Law are founded, are perhaps fairly obvious, the notion of public policy 
detailed in the Swiss Private International Law Act169 (PILA) is clearly 
capable of wider interpretation.  Pechstein suggested that one such 
interpretation should include the notion of human dignity and that submitting 
her samples to a veterinarian violated her own human dignity,170 essentially 
treating her as an animal, and, therefore, the interpretation should be deemed 
to be against public policy which should, according to Article 190(e) of PILA, 
annul the award.171  The SFT, in rejecting Pechstein’s submission, pointed out 
the weakness in her very narrow interpretation of the realities of expert 
scientific testimony.  “The fact that the principle of human dignity would 
prohibit a university based scientist, who is inter alia a qualified veterinarian, 
165. Id. 
166. See Gundel, 1 DIGEST OF COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT AWARDS at 569–70. 
167. An award will be deemed to be against public policy if it disregards certain principles in 
both the considerations and also in the findings of the award.  Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 6.1. 
168. Id.  
169. See LOI FÉDÉRAL SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ, art. 190(e). 
170. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 6.5; BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 8, 
2011, art. 7 (Switz.), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sz00000_.html. 
171. LOI FÉDÉRAL SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ, art. 190(e). 
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from acting as an expert in the framework of doping proceedings is not 
demonstrated.”172  
Had the SFT accepted Pechstein’s appeal on this point, then taken to its 
logical, albeit extended conclusion, there would appear to have been a real 
danger that the utility of scientific evidence produced before tribunals and the 
analysis of samples in the first place would be severely compromised, with 
only scientists with a very narrow range of expertise authorized to examine 
samples.  It is clear from the SFT that the pedigree of the scientist is irrelevant 
as long as the scientist has relevant expertise.   
In roundly rejecting Pechstein’s appeal the SFT concluded that 
she makes criticisms of an appellate nature of the award and 
presents her own views of the facts . . . . [S]he refers to 
numerous findings by the CAS as arbitrary, contradictory, 
incorrect or contrary to the file, but does not demonstrate to 
what extent it was impossible for her as a result to put forward 
and prove her point . . . in the proceedings.  She merely claims 
sweepingly at various points a violation of the principle of the 
right to be heard or of public policy without meeting the 
statutory requirements for reasons.173 
C. Request to the Swiss Federal Tribunal for Revision174 
In a request for revision dated March 4, 2010, Pechstein submitted to the 
SFT that it should annul the previous award of the CAS and send the matter 
back to the CAS for a new award.175Concerning the role of revision by the 
SFT in international arbitration awards, the SFT commented: 
The Federal Private International Law of December 18, 1997 
contains no provisions as to the revision of arbitral awards 
within the meaning of Art 176 ff PILA. According to case law 
of the Federal Tribunal, which filled the lacuna, the parties to 
an international arbitration have the extraordinary legal 
recourse of revision available, for which the Federal tribunal 
has jurisdiction.  If the Federal Tribunal upholds a request it 
does not decide the matter itself but sends it back to the 
172. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 6.5. 
173. Id. ¶ 6.6 (citation omitted).  
174. See generally Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Tribunal] Sept. 28, 2010, 4A_144/2010 
(Switz.). 
175. Id. ¶ C. 
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arbitral tribunal that decided it or to a new arbitral tribunal to 
be constituted.176 
The grounds for revision are very restrictive: 
[R]evision may be sought when the petitioner subsequently 
discovers significant facts or decisive evidence which he 
could not adduce in the previous proceedings to the exclusion 
of facts and evidence which emerged only after the award.  
The new facts must be significant, i.e., they must be suitable 
to change the factual basis of the award so that an accurate 
legal evaluation could lead to another decision. . . . Should the 
new evidence prove factual allegations already made 
previously, the petitioner must show that he could not bring 
the evidence in the earlier proceedings.177 
The SFT was scathing of Pechstein’s request for revision, pointing out that 
she brought no new evidence forward and instead relied on evidence that dealt 
extensively with the original CAS award, namely with the issue of her 
hereditary spherocytosis, the inherited disorder that she alleged caused the 
anomalies in her blood parameters, which eventually led to her two-year 
ban.178  Further, the SFT made it clear that Pechstein failed to cross the 
substantial threshold of demonstrating exactly why she had been unable to 
previously bring this evidence.179  It dismissed her allegations as vague, 
relying on scientifically unsubstantiated methods over and above a more 
established analysis.180  Based on such damning criticism, it is hardly 
surprising that the application for revision was rejected, with the SFT 
concluding, 
The Petitioner’s arguments in this respect merely seek a new 
assessment of the evidence.  Yet there is no ground for 
revision simply because the Arbitral Tribunal would have 
wrongly assessed some facts already known in the arbitral 
proceedings. . . . The request for revision is to be rejected to 
176. Id. ¶ 2. 
177. Id. ¶ 2.1.2. 
178. Id. ¶ 2.3. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
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the extent that the matter is capable of revision.181 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
It seems that the biological passport has arrived to add a considerable 
weapon to the armory of the anti-doping industry.  It has received welcome 
backing from both the CAS and the SFT and appears to be firmly established 
to now sit alongside those other pillars of anti-doping control, such as the 
principle of strict liability, the whereabouts rule, WADA’s Anti-Doping 
Administration and Management System, and nonanalytical positives.  What 
this development does for the first time, though, is to give the hint of a new 
dawn in anti-doping control.  The biological passport raises the possibility of 
shifting the emphasis away from the doping athlete and instead toward 
prioritizing the “clean” athlete.   
Up to this point in time—quite naturally and due to the limitations 
imposed by the culture of testing, subsequent failed tests, and consequent 
bans⎯the emphasis throughout sports has usually been on exposing athletes 
who are cheating.  It is without a doubt that the biological passport will 
continue to do this.  Although it is also the case that, periodically, participants 
have been caught up unwittingly in the system following either the unknowing 
or blameless ingestion of a banned substance, and it is the possible injustices 
created by this problem and the accompanying principle of strict liability that 
Article 10.5 (exceptional circumstances) of the Code sought to ameliorate.  
However, the use of nonanalytical positives highlighted throughout the 
BALCO scandal began to shift the emphasis away from the simple equation of 
failed test plus strict liability equals guilt and a ban.  For the first time, we had 
the notion of guilt without the failure of a test or indeed the manipulation of a 
doping sample.  What the passport does is raise the possibility of athletes 
being able to demonstrate their innocence rather than having to disprove their 
guilt through the production of a passport, which contains a profile that is 
indisputably consistent with a non-doping athlete.  Possession of a clean and 
unblemished passport may come to be viewed as the gateway into sporting 
events, as opposed to the current regime, which seeks to exclude athletes from 
such events in the shape of bans following positive tests.  If this shift in 
emphasis can lead to a consequent change in culture and attitude, then the 
impact of the passport may be felt far beyond the simple notion of making it 
harder to cheat in sports.  
 
181. Id. ¶¶ 2.4, 3. 
